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relatives to the crime scene, where Wilson walked them through his version of events. 4 The officers (1) responded that his story was not consistent with the evidence; and (2) lied to him by telling him that video cameras recorded the shooting. 5 The officers suggested that Wilson and his relatives talk things over at lunch and return to the police station in the afternoon. 6 Upon returning to the police station, Wilson's stepfather told Detective Krueger that the family consulted with a lawyer, who told Wilson not to speak to police. 7 Wilson then told a police officer "that if the police wished to speak with him, they should contact his attorney." 8 Upon these words leaving Wilson's lips, he was immediately arrested and taken to an interview room. 9 There, Wilson was read his Miranda rights, said he understood them, and gave an incriminatory statement that was inconsistent with his first statement. 10 The court denied Wilson's motion to suppress his second statement, and he was eventually convicted of murder.
11 Wilson appealed, claiming he validly invoked his Miranda rights prior to giving his second statement, meaning the statement was inadmissible under the Miranda right to counsel. 12 The Supreme Court of Kentucky agreed that the second statement would be inadmissible if Wilson properly invoked his Miranda rights; 13 however, the court concluded that Wilson's Miranda right to counsel had not yet attached because his request for an attorney was made before he was subjected to custodial interrogation.
14 As support, the court cited the following dicta from the Supreme Court's opinion in McNeil v. Wisconsin 15 :
We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than "custodial interrogation" . . . . Most rights must be asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against. The fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to future 4.
Id.
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custodial interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, with similar future effect. 16 The court thereafter laid out a laundry list of other court opinions from around the country, each of which also cited this dicta from McNeil to conclude that a suspect cannot invoke Miranda "rights unless he or she is subject to custodial interrogation." 17 The thesis of this Article is that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, suspects should be able to pre-assert their Miranda rights. This Article advances this thesis by reference to the Patient Self-Determination Act ("PSDA"), the so-called "medical Miranda," which requires all health care providers who accept money from Medicaid or Medicare to inform patients of their rights regarding advance directives and the refusal of medical treatment prior to admission in health care facilities. Specifically, this Article contends that the same policy goals that allow and even encourage patients to pre-assert their medical Miranda rights militate in favor of recognizing pre-assertion of criminal Miranda rights. Moreover, this Article argues that courts should determine whether custodial interrogation is "imminent" and thus conducive to pre-assertion of Miranda rights by applying the same "totality of the circumstances" test they use to decide whether police officers can pre-administer the Miranda warning.
Section I looks at the Miranda opinion and the subsequent Supreme Court opinions expanding and narrowing its scope. Section II analyzes the PSDA and the reasons why Congress thought it made sense to inform patients of the ability to execute advance directives before being admitted into health care facilities. Finally, Section III argues that the same principles that led to the passage of the PSDA support the ability of suspects to be able to pre-assert their Miranda rights when custodial interrogation is "imminent." The Article concludes by setting up a framework for determining whether a suspect properly pre-asserted his Miranda rights.
I. MIRANDA AND ITS PROGENY
A. Miranda and Fifth Amendment Rights
The interrogated suspects without first informing them of their right to remain silent and their right to counsel. 20 The four suspects each claimed that their interrogations violated the Fifth Amendment's requirement that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ." 21 The Supreme Court agreed, concluding that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." 22 The Court then defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 23 According to the Court, before subjecting a suspect to such custodial interrogation, law enforcement officers must adhere to the following procedural safeguard or its functional equivalent: "the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 24 In response to this Miranda warning, the suspect can voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive these rights. 25 If, however, the suspect indicates that he wishes to speak with an attorney, the interrogation cannot proceed. 26 Moreover, if the suspect is alone and invokes his right to remain silent by stating that he does not wish to be interrogated, the officers cannot question him. 27 
B. Michigan v. Mosley and the Right to Remain Silent
Nine years later, in 1975, the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether law enforcement officers can re-administer the Miranda warning and interrogate a suspect who has already invoked his
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See id. One of these suspects, Ernesto Miranda, was charged with kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery. Two police officers put Miranda in an interrogation room and emerged with a written confession two hours later without any indication they had informed him of his constitutional rights. See id. at 491-92.
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right to remain silent. In Michigan v. Mosley, 28 Detective James Cowie arrested Richard Mosley in connection with a string of robberies and read him the Miranda warning. 29 After Cowie began interrogating him, Mosley stated that he did not want to answer any questions about the robberies. 30 Cowie ceased questioning Mosley and took him to the cell block.
31
Over two hours later, a different detective took Mosley to the Homicide Bureau and read him the Miranda warning. 32 Mosley indicated that he understood the warning, and the detective proceeded to question him about a murder. 33 After first denying his involvement, Mosley incriminated himself in the homicide. 34 Upon being charged with first-degree murder, Mosley moved to suppress his confession, but the trial court denied the motion. 35 Following his ensuing conviction, Mosley appealed, claiming that the admission of his confession violated the Miranda doctrine.
36
The Supreme Court noted "that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.'" 37 Applying this standard, the Court concluded that Mosley's right to cut off questioning was, in fact scrupulously honored. 38 According to the Court, after Mosley initially asserted his right to remain silent, "the police here immediately ceased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation." 
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C. Edwards v. Arizona and the Edwards Prophylaxis
Another six years later, the Supreme Court was confronted with a similar question: can law enforcement officers re-administer the Miranda warning and interrogate a suspect who has already invoked his Miranda right to counsel? This time, however, the result was very different. In Edwards v. Arizona, 40 Robert Edwards was charged with robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder. 41 During custodial interrogation and after being read the Miranda warning, Edwards expressed interest in making a deal, prompting the interrogating officer to give him the county attorney's phone number. 42 Edwards dialed the number before quickly hanging up and saying, "I want an attorney before making a deal." 43 The officer responded by taking Edwards to the county jail.
44
The next morning, a guard informed Edwards that two detectives wished to speak to him, prompting Edwards to respond that he did not want to talk with anyone. 45 The guard responded that Edwards had to talk to the detectives. 46 Edwards thereafter met with the detectives, who read him the Miranda warning and played him the taped statement of an alleged accomplice who had implicated him. 47 Edwards then agreed to speak and incriminated himself. 48 Edwards moved to suppress his confession, but the trial court denied the motion, concluding that his statement was voluntary.
49
The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding "that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights." 50 The Court further found that a suspect who has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to 40. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."
51
The Supreme Court has subsequently referred to this holding as the "Edwards prophylaxis" because it is a judicially crafted, non-constitutional rule rather than one that is constitutionally required.
52
In other words, this prophylaxis is merely a "rule established to protect the Fifth Amendment based Miranda right to . . . counsel" and not part of the Miranda right itself. 53 Under this prophylaxis, the defendant's subsequent waiver of his right to counsel is presumed to be involuntary and the result of the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation. 54 Because this presumption is merely a prophylaxis, either the Supreme Court or a lower court can decide to expand it to different factual contexts. 55 That said, because the Edwards rule is prophylactic, a court can extend it to cover additional situations only after balancing benefits against costs and determining whether the extension serves its prophylactic purpose. McNeil nonetheless contended that the Court should still find attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel implied invocation of the Miranda right to counsel as a matter of sound policy. 73 In other words, McNeil asked the Court to extend the Edwards prophylaxis.
56
D. Pre-Assertion of
74
The Court refused, finding that "if we were to adopt petitioner's rule, most persons in pretrial custody for serious offenses would be unapproachable by police officers suspecting them of involvement in other crimes, even though they have never expressed any unwillingness to be questioned."
75
After rejecting this argument, the McNeil majority addressed the dissent in a footnote that was partially quoted in the introduction to this Article:
The dissent predicts that the result in this case will routinely be circumvented when, "[i]n future preliminary hearings, competent counsel . . . make sure that they, or their clients, make a statement on the record" invoking the Miranda right to counsel. We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than "custodial interrogation"-which a preliminary hearing will not always, or even usually, involve. If the Miranda right to counsel can be invoked at a preliminary hearing, it could be argued, there is no logical reason why it could not be invoked by a letter prior to arrest, or indeed even prior to identification as a suspect. Most rights must be asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against. The fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, with similar future effect. Assuming, however, that an assertion at arraignment would be effective, and would be routinely made, the mere fact that adherence to the principle of our decisions will not have substantial
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Id 81 At the end of this interrogation, the officers arrested Relford and transported him to jail. 82 The following day, a sergeant told Relford about telephone restrictions at the jail and asked him if he wanted to speak to a lawyer. 83 Relford answered that "he needed the public defender." 84 The sergeant responded that "a public defender would have to be appointed to him by the Court, however, if he wanted to call them, there was the phone, and I would provide the phone number for him." 85 Relford did not follow up on his request, but the police did follow up with Relford the next day, securing his confession after reading him the Miranda warning. Id.
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Relford was later charged with murder and moved to suppress his confession. 87 The district court agreed with Relford, finding that his statement that "he needed the public defender" was an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his Miranda right to counsel. 88 92 Dustin Barnett voluntarily went to the police station where Detective Curtis Lampert took him to an interrogation room before telling him that he did not have to talk with police and that he was free to leave. 93 Barnett responded that he wanted to leave and did not want to talk. 94 Detective Lampert responded by leaving the room, returning a few minutes later, and telling Barnett that he was no longer free to leave. 95 Lampert later read Barnett the Miranda warning and interrogated him, resulting in Barnett making a number of incriminatory statements.
96
After he was charged with first-degree murder with a deadly weapon and robbery with a deadly weapon, Barnett unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements and was convicted. 97 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada cited McNeil for the proposition that Miranda rights cannot be asserted anticipatorily.
98 Therefore, the court found no constitutional violation because "Barnett's initial invocation of 87.
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Id 101 Thereafter, her parents and coguardians moved for "a court order directing the withdrawal of their daughter's artificial feeding and hydration equipment after it became apparent that she had virtually no chance of recovering her cognitive faculties."
102 The Supreme Court of Missouri denied their request, concluding that they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Cruzan would have wanted life support withdrawn under the present circumstances.
103
In addressing this issue on appeal in June 1990, the United States Supreme Court concluded that "the common-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment." 104 The Court was able to infer this "constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment" by considering both the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and prior precedent regarding the right to bodily integrity. 105 That said, the Court found no problem with Missouri enacting a procedural safeguard that surrogates seeking to withdraw life support must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent patient would have made the same decision.
106
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote separately to emphasize a few points not addressed by the majority's opinion. One of these points was that the problem confronted by the Court could be avoided in the future based upon advance directives. 107 Specifically, she noted that decisions such as the one before the Court "might be avoided if the State considered an equally probative source of evidence: the
99.
Id. at *2. 100. 497 U.S. 261 (1990 patient's appointment of a proxy to make health care decisions on her behalf."
108 She also presciently pointed out that " [d] elegating the authority to make medical decisions to a family member or friend is becoming a common method of planning for the future."
109
Justice O'Connor observed that some states had started to allow agents appointed via durable power of attorney to make health care decisions while others "allow an individual to designate a proxy to carry out the intent of a living will."
110 Assessing these developments, Justice O'Connor concluded that "[t]hese procedures for surrogate decisionmaking, which appear to be rapidly gaining in acceptance, may be a valuable additional safeguard of the patient's interest in directing his medical care." 113 Under the PSDA, any health care providers receiving Medicare or Medicaid payments must provide written information to patients regarding their rights under the law of the state in which the facility is located. 114 This disclosure must include written information about the right "to make decisions concerning such medical care, including the right to accept or refuse medical or surgical treatment and the right to formulate advance directives."
115 It also must include written information about "the written policies of the provider or organization respecting the implementation of such rights." After receiving this information, the patient can choose whether to execute an advance directive, which the PSDA defines as "a written instruction, such as a living will or durable power of attorney for health care, recognized under State law (whether statutory or as recognized by the courts of the State) and relating to the provision of such care when the individual is incapacitated."
118 The PSDA requires the health care facility "to document in a prominent part of the individual's current medical record whether or not the individual has executed an advance directive." 
a. Pre-asserting rights before isolation
Part of the reason for the passage of the PSDA was the recognition of the isolation that patients often face when admitted to health care facilities. 120 This isolation is especially acute in cases where patients are faced with terminal illnesses and end-of-life decisions. 121 Indeed, some have asserted that, "like soldiers and prisoners, they are . . . 'captives' of their disease, their physicians and hospital, and their enforced isolation."
122 Moreover, elderly patients are often "frail, seriously sick, and socially isolated from the outset of the provider/patient relationship."
123 In such cases: The patient may understandably see herself as a burden-as requiring the family to waste the resources to maintain her in a painful and virtually incommunicado condition-until the money, the pain, and the technology is cut off by someone who neither knows her, nor really cares for her, but cares only that the medicare check comes in payment. 124 By allowing a patient to pre-assert his health care rights, the PSDA empowers the patient to make important decisions "when the patient is healthy and before she 'experiences the dislocation that often attends inpatient admission.'" 125 At the same time, the PSDA does not seek to coerce a patient into making certain health care decisions. During the Senate debate on the PSDA, an American Bar Association spokesperson expressed concern "for the indigent, poorly educated and isolated individuals who could be vulnerable to facile execution of documents urged upon them by over-enthusiastic caretakers."
126 In response, the PSDA was written so that health care providers merely provide patients with information about advance directives, not the directives themselves.
b. Overcoming the secrecy of the physician-patient relationship
The physician-patient relationship is traditionally shrouded in secrecy based upon a nexus of laws ensuring confidentiality. 128 Collectively, these laws "shield doctor-patient interactions from the scrutiny of the outside world, thereby ensuring that the doctor's influence will go unmitigated and undetected." 129 The PSDA addresses this issue in two meaningful ways. First, it ensures that, if end-of-life "disputes arise . . . patients or their decision-makers and physicians will have a summary of patients' rights under state law to make life-sustaining medical treatment decisions." 131 Second, it facilitates the execution of advance directives, ensuring that there will be a written record of their wishes that will be known and honored by health care providers. 
c. Counteracting the unfamiliarity of health care facilities
The PSDA recognizes that patients being admitted into health care facilities can become disoriented based upon the unfamiliarity of the new staff and surroundings confronting them. 133 The unfamiliar surroundings facing a patient upon admission make a health care facility a difficult place for patients to decide to execute advance directives. 134 The PSDA, however, facilitates the execution of advance directives "when the patient is healthy and before she 'experiences the dislocation that often attends inpatient admission.'" 135
d. Preventing coercion
The PSDA was passed in large part to address the coercion that a patient can face when receiving medical care, especially in cases 130 involving possible end-of-life care. 136 Many have argued that the physician-patient relationship is "inherently coercive" because "the balance of power between doctor and patient is almost entirely one-sided." 137 Others have noted that the physician-patient relationship is rife with actual coercion because "physicians manipulate the consent process to obtain the result they desire by the tone and sequence in which they convey the risk information . . . ."
138 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has recognized that end-of-life situations are especially rife with the risk of coercion. 139 Finally, coercion is a concern throughout the field of advance directives and not limited to fear of doctor or hospital staff coercion. Some mental health advocates fear that family members may coerce persons with mental illness into signing advance directives, consenting to treatment they do not want. On the other hand, mental health professionals fear that advocates will persuade the mentally ill to reject both needed and wanted prospective treatment.
140
The PSDA addresses these concerns by informing patients about their health care rights so that they can choose whether to execute documents like advance directives before their condition deteriorates and they are more susceptible to heightened pressures from a variety of sources.
e. Promoting autonomy
The PSDA was primarily passed because of the belief that patients were unable to exercise autonomy in making health care decisions under the existing framework. 142 Specifically, most patients "cannot exercise even a semblance of autonomy about where they will spend 136 The PSDA was passed based on the recognition that informing patients of their health care rights after they have been admitted is often too late to allow them to effectively understand and assert those rights. 145 By providing information at an earlier stage, the PSDA allows patients to engage in advance planning that "avoids the need for state coercion and incompetency adjudication with its accompanying labeling effects while preserving the individual's sense of dignity and autonomy."
146
The PSDA is directed more toward "the process of decisionmaking rather than the decision itself."
147 The intent behind the PSDA was "to give patients accurate and uniform information without creating undue anxiety or pressuring them to execute documents they either did not understand or genuinely want."
148 Because it requires health care providers to supply information concerning health care rights at an early stage, it ensures that patients are "allowed to make their own decisions about the use or nonuse of advance directives." The PSDA has frequently been described as " 
A. Introduction
In its dicta in McNeil, the Supreme Court expressed skepticism about extending the Edwards prophylaxis to cover pre-assertions of Miranda rights for two primary reasons. First, the Court noted that most rights cannot be asserted until "the government seeks to take the action they protect against."
153 Second, the Court feared that it could place no meaningful limitations on the pre-assertion of the Miranda right to counsel if it approved such pre-assertion. 154 Instead, the Miranda right to counsel could be asserted "by a letter prior to arrest" or "prior to identification as a suspect," with the police subsequently unable to interrogate the suspect in perpetuity. 155. Such a concern would not be present with pre-assertion of the right to remain silent because that right merely needs to be "scrupulously honored," allowing for officers to seek to interrogate the suspect hours later. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
supporting the pre-assertion of health care rights that led to the passage of the PSDA justify legal recognition of the pre-assertion of Miranda rights. Part C of this section contends that courts have already laid the framework for pre-assertion of Miranda rights in a way that allows for equitable and meaningful limitations to be placed on pre-assertion. Part D of this section asserts that the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer 156 quells concerns that authorizing pre-assertions would hinder police investigations in perpetuity. Finally, Part E of this section notes that the Supreme Court has recently created an important limitation on the principles at the heart of the Edwards prophylaxis that supports its extension to certain pre-assertions of Miranda rights.
B. The Similar Justifications for Criminal and Medical Miranda
ASSERTING RIGHTS BEFORE ISOLATION
The Miranda opinion was based to a large extent on the fact that most custodial interrogations take place "in the isolated setting of the police station," with the suspect being incommunicado, i.e., unable to communicate with others besides his interrogators. 157 The Miranda Court began by noting that each of the cases before it involved "incommunicado interrogations of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere . . . ."
158
The Court observed that the largely incommunicado nature of most custodial interrogations keeps "what transpires at such interrogations" largely under wraps and also cited to a myriad of cases in which it previously uncovered police extortion of confessions via physical violence and "sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado . . . ." 159 Later, the Court focused on three prior cases in which it reversed convictions because police engaged in mental rather than physical coercion during custodial interrogation. 160 With regard to these interrogations, the Court concluded that, "[i]n other settings, these individuals might have exercised their constitutional rights. In the incommunicado police-dominated atmosphere, they succumbed." 161 The Court later found a suspect's inability to speak with others (or his lack of knowledge of that ability) inconsistent with the privilege against In terms of isolation, the Court pointed out that police manuals instruct officers "[t]o highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings" of a stationhouse custodial interrogation. 163 The Court thereafter determined that these practices are effective because, "[a]s a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery."
164 Finally, the Court tied both the isolation and incommunicado strands of its analysis together, concluding that the government bears the heavy burden of proving subsequent waiver after a suspect who previously asserted his right to remain silent or right to an attorney subsequently waived that right. 165 From the Court's perspective, "[s]ince the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders." 166 The Court again referenced police manuals, which inform officers "that the 'principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-being alone with the person under interrogation.'" 171 The privacy and secrecy of the process led the Court to conclude that preliminary advice by an attorney is insufficient; instead, upon request, counsel must be present throughout a custodial interrogation because "[e]ven preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process." 172 According to at least one source, " [t] he Miranda Court's greatest concern was the inherent coercion in incommunicado interrogation that arises from the privacy and secrecy of" custodial interrogations. 
In its subsequent opinion in
COUNTERACTING THE UNFAMILIARITY OF THE STATIONHOUSE
While officers are required to give the Miranda warning whenever and wherever they subject suspects to custodial interrogation, the Miranda Court's opinion was born out of four cases in which police conducted interrogations within the four walls of the stationhouse. According to the Court, in each of the cases before it, "the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures." 174 As previously noted, the Miranda Court cited to police manuals, which instructed officers "[t]o highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings" of a stationhouse custodial interrogation. 175 The Court then went on to explain that If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator's office or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions of criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The Given the aura of invincibility surrounding "the forces of the law," it is unsurprising that the Miranda Court deemed custodial interrogations inherently coercive. The Court deemed the Miranda warning necessary "to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings . . . ." 179 Later, the Court found that custodial interrogation without the Miranda warning "contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." 180 The Court then restated this conclusion even more forcefully, finding that the Miranda warning is "an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere." 181 The Miranda dissent put it the most concisely, characterizing the majority's position as declaring that "in-custody interrogation is inherently coercive," 182 a characterization that the Court has often repeated.
183
The Court's conclusion in Miranda rested not merely on the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation but also on the actual coercive techniques that law enforcement officials are taught to apply while questioning suspects. As noted, some of these techniques involve isolating the suspect within the four walls of the stationhouse and making sure that the interrogation is conducted incommunicado. 184 The Court also cited to police manuals instructing officers "to display an air 176 of confidence in the suspect's guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming certain details." 185 Additionally, the Court referenced the recommendation that police officers team up to interrogate suspects, using the classic "good cop, bad cop" technique. 186 The Court then later concluded:
From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must "patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which the desired objective may be attained." 
PROMOTING FREE CHOICE/AUTONOMY
In the end, the Miranda Court combined all of the above factors to get to the heart of the issue: Law enforcement officers must not conduct custodial interrogations in a manner that runs afoul of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 188 And, according to the Court, a custodial interrogation only complies with the Fifth Amendment privilege if the interrogating officer apprises the suspect of his right to remain silent as well as his right to an attorney and secures a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those rights.
189
The purpose, then, of the Miranda warning is to ensure that the statements that a suspect makes in response to custodial interrogation are the result of a free and rational waiver of his constitutional rights. This is a theme that the Miranda majority repeated throughout its opinion. The Court found none of the four convictions under review to be constitutionally viable because "in none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free 185 The Court then found that these concerns were not unique to the cases before it but instead would apply to any custodial interrogation: "Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice." 192 Therefore, "whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time."
193 Moreover, a suspect must thereafter be able to invoke his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney "at any time prior to or during questioning" because, "[w]ithout the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked." acquisition of evidence from the accused." 199 The Miranda warning is likely ineffective in large part because it primarily governs custodial interrogations conducted by detectives, "a small elite in the police force who can become trained and experienced in minimizing the effect of Miranda or even using it to their strategic advantage." 200 204 the Act is actually much more efficacious than its criminal counterpart because it allows patients to assert their health care rights before admission. Conversely, criminal suspects cannot assert their Miranda rights until they are subjected to the very process that the Supreme Court has deemed inherently coercive. 205 
PRE-ASSERTION OF RIGHTS BEFORE GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
In McNeil, the Court noted that most rights cannot be asserted until "the government seeks to take the action they protect against." 206 To the extent that this statement is true, 207 this thinking probably makes sense for most rights. For instance, why would a citizen need to assert his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment before the government seeks to sentence him to the death penalty, life imprisonment, or some other harsh criminal penalty? Similarly, why would a citizen need to assert his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury before the government charges him with violating a criminal law? In either of these cases, it would be nonsensical for the citizen to pre-assert his rights, and no coercive force would prevent him from asserting his rights after the government sought to act.
Conversely, both health care and Miranda rights seem to fall into a different category based upon the unique circumstances surrounding their assertion. As previously noted, several sources have recognized the difficulty that both patients and suspects face in asserting their rights due to factors such as isolation and coercion. Therefore, it makes sense for both patients and suspects to be able to pre-assert their rights because the future versions of themselves might not be able to assert these rights. 208 In similar contexts, legislatures have passed laws based upon exactly this type of thinking. One example of this type of law is a mandatory arrest law, which requires police officers responding to 911 calls to arrest suspects if they have probable cause to believe that they committed acts of domestic violence, regardless of whether the alleged victim consents to the arrest. 209 Currently, approximately twenty-two states have some version of a mandatory arrest law, and many prosecutors' offices also have no-drop policies, which "require prosecution of a domestic violence perpetrator, regardless of the victim's wishes . . . ." 210 The rationale for these laws and policies are the same as the rationale for the PSDA: when isolated with her abuser before his arrest and prosecution, a domestic violence victim might be coerced into not pressing charges or pursuing the case to trial. 211 While many argue that these laws and policies infringe upon the victim's autonomy, 212 others claim that they promote the autonomy and empowerment of the victim by honoring the choice that she made to call 911 rather than her subsequent decision to drop the case after potentially being subjected to isolation and coercion. 213 These same rationales similarly support the idea that the Edwards prophylaxis should be extended to allow suspects to pre-assert their Miranda rights. In Miranda, the Court found the Miranda warning to be constitutionally mandated to ensure that suspects either assert their rights or execute a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those rights. 214 But, as used to be the case with domestic violence victims as well as patients, especially those suffering from potentially terminal illnesses, there is a real danger that their ultimate decisions will be involuntary based upon a combination of factors such as isolation and coercion.
215
C. Applying the Existing Miranda Framework to Allow
for Pre-Assertion
INVOCATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS WHEN INTERROGATION IS "IMMINENT"
Assuming that courts accept the general theory that the Edwards prophylaxis should be extended to cover some pre-assertions of Miranda rights, there is a remaining question over where to draw the 663, 708 (1994) . Similarly, if a suspect were allowed to pre-assert his Miranda rights, nothing would prevent him from reinitiating communications with the police. Furthermore, if a suspect pre-asserted his Miranda right to counsel, nothing would prevent the police from interrogating him once counsel was appointed. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
line. In McNeil, the Court expressed concern that authorizing pre-assertion of the Miranda rights could lead to their assertion "by a letter prior to arrest" or "prior to identification as a suspect." 216 The possibility of such a slippery slope could be reason not to authorize pre-assertion because it could "unduly hamper[] the gathering of information." 217 It appears, however, that a mechanism is already in place for courts to approve of a more incremental extension of the Edwards prophylaxis to cover only certain pre-assertions. As noted, courts across the country have used the McNeil dicta to conclude that Miranda rights cannot be invoked "in a context other than 'custodial interrogation.'" 218 That said, both federal 219 and state courts 220 across the country have held that individuals can assert their Miranda rights either during custodial interrogation or "when an interrogation is imminent." 221 In other words, many courts have concluded that pre-assertion of the Miranda rights when interrogation is "imminent" is an assertion made in the context of custodial interrogation. 222 Despite this language, however, courts have applied an extremely narrow construction to the word "imminent," which has only allowed suspects to invoke their Miranda rights "in response to or just before interrogation." 223 For instance, in Hoerauf v. State, 224 the defendant asked to speak to an attorney both while he was being fingerprinted during booking and while being placed in a holding cell hours before being taken to an interrogation room. 225 Eventually, the defendant was taken to the interrogation room, waived his Miranda rights, and confessed. 226 In finding that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland cited its prior opinion in Marr v. State, 227 which in turn cited five federal courts in support of the proposition that Miranda rights can be asserted during actual or imminent custodial interrogation. 228 The court, however, concluded that the defendant did not invoke his right to counsel when custodial interrogation was imminent; instead, "all such requests were made by appellant prior to being placed in the interrogation room and questioned by Detective Sofelkanik." 229 Similarly, in Pardon v. State, 230 Raymond Pardon asked to speak to an attorney after he was arrested and being booked into detention on the same charge that would lead to his custodial interrogation. 231 The District Court of Appeal of Florida held that he had not validly invoked his right to counsel because the interrogation of Pardon was not imminent. 232 He was merely being booked into detention, albeit on the same charge on which he was later questioned. 233 Questioning did not occur until a few hours later. 234 Any request for an attorney at this point was an anticipatory invocation of his Miranda rights, which would not prevent the officers from later reading him his rights preparatory to interrogation. 235 Indeed, in applying a limited construction to the word "imminent," the Third Circuit in Alston v. Redmond 236 was only able to find two cases applying a somewhat broader construction of the word.
237 Even these cases, however, did not apply expansive definitions of the word "imminent."
In United States v. Kelsey, 238 Joseph Kelsey asked to see his attorney three or four times after being arrested in his home. 239 police, however, "did not question Kelsey at this point and did not read him his Miranda warnings until much later." 240 Later, Kelsey was read the Miranda warning at his home, waived his Miranda rights, and confessed. 241 The Tenth Circuit honored Kelsey's pre-assertion of his Miranda rights, concluding that Kelsey was in "precisely the type of coercive atmosphere that generates the need for application of the Edwards rule" when he was arrested in his home. 242 In State v. Torres, 243 the defendant was arrested for murdering her husband. 244 She was subsequently detained in the conference room of the Sheriff's Department from 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., whereupon she was taken to the sheriff's office and told that she would be questioned shortly. 245 The defendant asked to speak to counsel twice while in the conference room and once when taken to the sheriff's office. 246 When she was eventually questioned at 10:35 p.m., however, she waived her Miranda rights and confessed. 247 The Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the defendant had validly invoked her Miranda right because "[i]t would make little sense to require a defendant already in custody to wait until the onset of questioning or the recitation of her Miranda rights before being permitted to invoke her right to counsel." 248 While most courts have narrowly construed the term "imminent," at least one court has applied a more expansive construction. In State v. Hambly, 249 Detectives Rindt and Clausing approached Scott Hambly "in a parking lot outside his apartment and attempted to convince him to speak to them without their taking him into custody." 250 In response, Hambly repeatedly refused to speak, prompting Detective Rindt to place him under arrest. 251 As Rindt shepherded Hambly to his squad car, Hambly "said that he wanted to speak to an attorney."
252 Rindt responded by placing Hambly "in the back of the car and told him that he could call an attorney once they arrived at the Washington County Jail." 253 Miranda rights, and made a confession. 254 The trial court eventually denied Hambly's motion to suppress his confession, and Hambly was ultimately convicted of delivery of cocaine.
255
In addressing Hambly's subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that a suspect can assert his Miranda rights when custodial interrogation is "imminent or impending." 256 In finding that Hambly asserted his Miranda right to counsel when interrogation was imminent or impending, the court used the following reasoning:
In the minutes leading up to the defendant's request for counsel, Detective Rindt made it clear that he intended to question the defendant. The defendant could have reasonably surmised that because Rindt was persistent in wanting to interrogate him, Rindt would continue to attempt to interrogate him in a custodial setting after he refused to speak with Rindt in a noncustodial setting. The defendant had no reason to believe that Rindt's eagerness to question him dissipated once Rindt took him into custody.
257
Hambly thus shows how most courts could easily apply the existing Miranda framework to allow for pre-assertions of Miranda rights by simply applying a broader definition of the word "imminent." That said, the court's opinion in Hambly was anything but easy. The court floated but rejected the possibility that a suspect should be able to assert his Miranda rights "any time the suspect is in custody, even before Miranda warnings or the onset of questioning." 258 The court also surveyed every case which had found that a suspect could invoke his Miranda rights when custodial interrogation was imminent but determined that none of these cases actually set forth a standard for defining imminence. 259 Ultimately, the court concluded "that an interrogation is impending or imminent if a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed that interrogation was imminent or impending."
260
Hambly therefore illustrates another reason why courts could refuse to extend the Edwards prophylaxis to pre-assertions of Miranda rights. Currently, according to nearly all courts, suspects can only assert their Miranda rights during or just before custodial interrogation, which is the same point in time when the police must administer the Miranda warning. The argument could thus be made that allowing suspects to pre-assert their Miranda rights would require courts to create a second test that is different from the test for determining when officers must administer the Miranda warning. Such an argument, however, would be misguided because courts can determine whether a suspect can pre-assert his Miranda rights by using the same test that they already apply for deciding whether an officer can pre-administer the Miranda warning.
THE ABILITY OF OFFICERS TO PRE-ADMINISTER THE
MIRANDA WARNING A year after the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Hambly, it handed down its decision in State v. Grady. 261 In Grady, Marchand Grady voluntarily went to the police station to discuss the murder of Allen Jemison.
262 Upon arrival at 8:16 p.m., Grady was indisputably not in custody when Detective Corbett began questioning him about the murder; nonetheless, "Detective Corbett began the interview by administering Miranda warnings to Grady so as to be 'better safe than sorry,' and Grady indicated that he understood the rights he was read." 263 At 10:45 p.m., another suspect being questioned separately said that Grady killed Jemison, resulting in Grady being placed under arrest. 264 At this point, "Miranda warnings were not readministered to Grady," who made several inculpatory statements. 265 Before trial, Grady moved to suppress his post-arrest statements, but the court denied his motion, and he was ultimately convicted of murder.
266
On appeal, Grady asked the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to adopt a "bright-line rule," pursuant to which "any and all Miranda warnings prior to custody [are] ipso facto ineffective." 267 The court declined to adopt this bright-line rule and instead applied the totality of the circumstances test utilized by "the overwhelming majority of other courts who have considered this question. before custody and the failure to re-administer the warning immediately before custodial interrogation is unconstitutional by looking at multiple factors, including whether the same officer or officers conducted the questioning, whether the location changed, whether the subject matter of the questioning was consistent, whether a reminder of the Miranda rights was given before the custodial interrogation began, whether the suspect was mentally or emotionally impaired, whether more coercive tactics were used when the suspect was placed in custody, the suspect's past experience with law enforcement, and how much time elapsed between the administration of the Miranda warnings and the custodial interrogation or confession.
269
In its opinion, the Grady court cited to a laundry list of opinions from courts around the country, each of which found that the pre-administration of the Miranda warning hours before custodial interrogation was constitutional, even when the warning was not re-administered immediately before custodial interrogation. 270 The court then agreed with this analysis, noting that the goal of Miranda is "to inform the suspect that the interrogators will recognize his or her rights if exercised" and "ensure that a confession is free and unconstrained."
271 According to the court, Given this purpose, a rule that assumes a suspect is a blank slate with no awareness of his or her rights as soon as he or she is placed in custody is a head-in-the-sand approach. In addition, application of Grady's bright-line rule would focus the analysis on the custody status of a suspect rather than on the individual's comprehension and waiver of his rights. It is, in short, form over substance. A rule that says warnings given one minute before custody are ineffective per se because they were not given when the suspect was actually in custody is manifestly unreasonable.
272
In addition to finding that a bright-line rule against pre-administration betrayed Miranda's primary purpose, the court concluded that beyond its lack of fidelity to the purposes and principles behind Miranda, Grady's approach is unworkable. One of its major flaws is that it assumes that the precise point of custody is fixed and known at the time of questioning. While this may sometimes be the case, it is not always true. In practice, it is not always clear when a suspect is officially under arrest. 273 These lines of analysis by the court were eminently reasonable and similar to the analysis conducted by other courts on the issue. 274 Conversely, this analysis lays bare the unreasonableness of courts failing to allow suspects to pre-assert their Miranda rights. If courts are unwilling to treat suspects like a blank slate at the start of custodial interrogation, why do they treat pre-assertions of Miranda rights as if they were written on Etch-a-Sketches simply because they were made before the technical definition of custodial interrogation? If the lack of clarity over when a suspect is technically in custody justifies allowing officers to pre-administer the Miranda warning, why are suspects, who have much less familiarity with the legal definition of custody, not similarly able to pre-assert their Miranda rights?
This Article thus proposes a test based on reciprocity and equanimity: Suspects should be allowed to pre-assert their Miranda rights under the same circumstances that officers are allowed to pre-administer the Miranda warning. In other words, if the totality of the circumstances supports a finding that an officer could pre-administer the Miranda warning, the same totality of the circumstances should support a finding that the suspect could pre-assert his Miranda rights.
For example, consider the outcomes in the following two cases: First, in People v. Petrone, 275 Officer Roy Rodriguez responded to a 911 call regarding a robbery of money and jewelry at the house of Hazel Hudson. 276 Later, about a mile and a half away from Hudson's house, Officer Rodriguez pulled over a car driven by John Petrone. 277 Petrone consented to a search of his vehicle, which led to Officer Rodriguez discovering jewelry and $600 in cash. 278 Officer Rodriguez did not arrest Petrone but did read him the Miranda warning and asked him about the jewelry. 279 Petrone responded that the jewelry belonged to his mother and was in his car because he was in the process of moving and did not want it to get stolen.
280
Officer Rodriguez then arrested Petrone and took him to the police station, where he subjected him to a custodial interrogation one hour and fifteen minutes later; Rodriguez never re-administered the Miranda warning. 281 In finding no issue with the trial court's denial of Petrone's motion to suppress the statement he made during custodial interrogation, the appellate court applied the totality of the circumstances test. 282 According to the court, "the effectiveness of appellant's initial waiver was not reduced by the one hour and fifteen minutes between when appellant was first Mirandized and when he was subsequently interrogated at the police station." Trooper Poppe then told Stanley that he believed he was engaged in criminal activity and that he was detaining him pending the arrival of a narcotics-detection dog. 290 Stanley demanded to speak to an attorney on several occasions, but Trooper Poppe answered that Stanley did not have any right to counsel because he was merely being detained, not arrested. 291 About half an hour later, the dog arrived and alerted to the trunk, leading to discovery of a gun but no drugs. Given the factual similarity between Petrone and Stanley, it seems clear that the court would have had no problem with Trooper Poppe pre-administering the Miranda warning after calling for the narcotics-detection dog and failing to re-administer the Miranda warning before engaging in subsequent custodial interrogation. Therefore, the same dispensation should have been given to Stanley, allowing him to pre-assert his Miranda rights at the same point in time.
The same analysis could also be done in other contexts. For instance, courts have found that officers can pre-administer the Miranda warning while asking suspects for consent to search. 298 Therefore, despite current precedent to the contrary, 299 courts should find that suspects can pre-assert their Miranda rights when being asked to consent to searches. Because courts have allowed officers to pre-administer the Miranda warning before suspects take polygraph examinations, 300 Such a reciprocal test is not merely rooted in fairness; it also means that courts would not have to create any new test for dealing with pre-assertions of Miranda rights, conserving judicial resources.
D. The Limited Duration of Miranda Rights
Prior to 2010, critics of expanding the Edwards prophylaxis to cover pre-assertions could claim that it would hinder police investigations because it would prevent officers from being able to interrogate suspects in perpetuity. First, such a criticism would not be entirely accurate because an officer could still interrogate such a suspect once he was given counsel or if the suspect himself reinitiated communications with the officer. 302 Indeed, in the aforementioned Hambly case, in which the suspect pre-asserted his Miranda rights, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found no constitutional violation because the suspect himself initiated further communications. 303 Second, this criticism is no longer accurate at all after the Supreme Court's 2010 opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer. In Shatzer, Michael Shatzer was in prison for an unrelated crime when he was approached by a detective about allegations he had abused his son before being incarcerated. 304 Thinking he was being questioned about the unrelated crime, Shatzer initially waived his Miranda rights but later refused to speak to the detective without an attorney upon realizing he was being asked about abusing his son. 305 The detective immediately ceased questioning Shatzer. 306 Two and a half years later, another detective approached Shatzer about the allegations he had abused his son. 307 At this point, Shatzer waived his Miranda rights, failed a polygraph test, and eventually confessed to the crime. 308 Shatzer later moved to suppress his confession, claiming that the Edwards prophylaxis precluded the detective from interrogating him once he had invoked his Miranda right to counsel. 309 The trial court denied Shatzer's motion to suppress, and the Supreme Court eventually agreed with this decision. 310 First, the Supreme Court held that a return to the general prison population was a break in "custody," at least for Miranda purposes.
311 Second, the court held that a break in custody of at least fourteen days renders the Edwards prophylaxis inapplicable; in other words, if an officer approaches a suspect at least fourteen days after he has validly asserted his Miranda right to counsel, the suspect's statements are not presumed to be involuntary.
312
E. The Edwards Prophylaxis Should Be Extended to Cover Pre-Assertions
Ultimately, courts deciding whether to expand the Edwards prophylaxis to cover certain pre-assertions of Miranda rights must determine whether the benefits of extension outweigh the costs. 313 The primary benefit of the Edwards prophylaxis is that it acts to "'[p]reserv[e] the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with police only through counsel' by 'prevent[ing] police from badgering [him] into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.'" 314 Its secondary benefit is "conserv[ing] judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness." 315 Conversely, the costs of the Edwards prophylaxis are "the in-fact voluntary confessions it excludes from trial, and the voluntary confessions it deters law enforcement officers from even trying to obtain." 316 Simply put, courts must determine whether the number of coerced confessions an expanded Edwards prophylaxis would exclude justify the number of voluntary confessions the expanded prophylaxis would prevent.
317
In Shatzer, the Court refused to extend the Edwards prophylaxis because it concluded that the interrogation at issue did not implicate the "concer [n] suspect will be coerced into saying yes." 319 Instead, the Court concluded that "there is no reason to believe a suspect will view confession as 'the only way to end his interrogation' when, before the interrogation begins, he is told that he can avoid it by simply requesting that he not be interrogated without counsel present-an option that worked before." 320 Conversely, in cases in which suspects seek to pre-assert their Miranda rights, their attempts are rebuffed. Indeed, such suspects are often flatly told that they cannot assert their rights. 321 Therefore, when they are later read the Miranda warning, there is a significant reason to believe that they will view confessions as the only way to end their interrogations.
In Davis v. United States, 322 the Supreme Court found that a suspect's Miranda rights were not violated because the suspect failed to unequivocally assert them. 323 That said, in their opinion concurring in the judgment, four Justices partially analogized the case before them to the pre-Miranda opinion in Escobedo v. Illinois, 324 in which the Supreme Court deemed a confession involuntary in large part due to the fact that the suspect's preliminary request to speak to an attorney was denied. 325 According to the concurring Justices in Davis, "[w]hen a suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored . . . , he may well see further objection as futile and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation."
326
In McNeil, the Supreme Court did not deny that allowing suspects to pre-assert their Miranda rights would preserve the integrity of the accused's choice. Instead, it merely worried that extending the Edwards prophylaxis would not conserve judicial resources because it would be impossible to place meaningful limitations on the ability of suspects to pre-assert their Miranda rights. 327 This Article, however, has set forth a test that allows courts to put meaningful limitations on both the front and back end of the process. On the back end, the Court's recent opinion in Shatzer means that officers can interrogate a suspect fourteen days after pre-assertion of the Miranda right to counsel and even earlier if the suspect re-initiates fourteen days after he initially asserted his Miranda right to counsel by using the following reasoning:
When . . . a suspect has been released from his pretrial custody and has returned to his normal life for some time before the later attempted interrogation, there is little reason to think that his change of heart regarding interrogation without counsel has been coerced. He has no longer been isolated. He has likely been able to seek advice from an attorney, family members, and friends. And he knows from his earlier experience that he need only demand counsel to bring the interrogation to a halt. . . . His change of heart is less likely attributable to "badgering" than it is to the fact that further deliberation in familiar surroundings has caused him to believe (rightly or wrongly) that cooperating with the investigation is in his interest. Uncritical extension of Edwards to this situation would not significantly increase the number of genuinely coerced confessions excluded. The "justification for a conclusive presumption disappears when application of the presumption will not reach the correct result most of the time."
336
In pre-assertion cases covered by the test proposed in this Article, none of these factors are present. The "earlier experience" of suspects in these cases is unsuccessful assertion of Miranda rights, which might make them believe subsequent attempts at assertion would be futile. Given that suspects would only be allowed to pre-assert their Miranda rights when custodial interrogation is "imminent," these suspects are not able to return to their normal lives for any period of time. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that they had a change of heart regarding waiver and every reason to believe that their confessions are simply the product of a process that the Supreme Court has deemed "inherently coercive." 337 Accordingly, legal acknowledgment of pre-assertions of Miranda rights will likely lead to the correct result most of the time. have a "full opportunity" and a "continuous opportunity" to exercise their Fifth Amendment rights. 338 Decades of empirical data, however, reveal that this opportunity is illusory, with around eighty percent of suspects waiving their Miranda rights. 339 This Article has identified the likely reason for this under-assertion: the inability of suspects to pre-assert their Miranda rights until they are subjected to the very process that the Supreme Court has described as "inherently coercive." 340 The unwillingness of courts to honor pre-assertions of Miranda rights can be traced back to dicta from the Supreme Court's opinion in McNeil. The McNeil Court cautioned against crediting pre-assertions because most rights cannot be anticipatorily asserted and because meaningful limitations could not be placed upon the right to pre-assert. This Article has identified the PSDA, the so-called "medical Miranda," as a useful analogue that demonstrates how allowing pre-assertion of certain rights can bolster autonomy and counteract the effects of coercion and isolation. Given the comparisons between the physician-patient and officer-suspect relationships, the same principles that support the pre-assertion of medical Miranda rights also support the pre-assertion of criminal Miranda rights. Moreover, the framework is already in place for courts to credit such pre-assertions in an equitable way that will not strain judicial resources. 
